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PIGGYBACK PLANS
EUGENE D. ANDERSON* AND DICKSON R. Loos**
INTRODUCTION
Speaking in the vernacular of the transportation industry, the
word piggyback imports basically an integration of transportation
media. As a general concept, it involves the movement of freight
loaded in the vehicles of one transportation medium which are, in turn,
carried aboard the vehicles of another such medium. The term piggy-
back is more specifically associated with the railroads' transportation
of motor vehicle trailers carried on railroad flatcars, and is commonly
referred to as trailer-on-flatcar service (TOFC). This form of inte-
gration may be contrasted with its nautical counterpart, fishyback,
whereby railroad cars or truck trailers are carried aboard ship, and
with birdieback, the aero-integration of transportation systems.'
Although piggyback is by no means novel to our times, its definite
origin remains an historical question mark.' For purposes of giving
it a crude beginning, one may allude, with some certainty, to the
transportation of sectionalized canal boats on flatcars, as part of a
Philadelphia to Pittsburgh rail-water service from 1843 to 1857. The
year 1885 marks another significant date in the development of piggy-
back, for in January of that year, the Long Island Railroad began
operating its so-called "farmer's trains," connecting points on Long
Island and the East River. The trains carried four loaded produce
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1 These general concepts were discussed in a speech, Traffic Impact of Piggyback,
by Interstate Commerce Commissioner Arpaia on March 10, 1959; excerpts of this
speech appear in 26 ICC Prac. J. 1018 (1959).
2 See the address, A Look at Piggyback Transportation, delivered by ICC Chair-
man Hutchison before the Railroad Transportation Institute, N.Y., Nov. 21, 1957.
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wagons per flatcar with teams riding in specially prepared boxcars.'
Probably the most vivid application of piggyback service, during these
pioneer days was, the transportation of circus wagons aboard railroad
flatcars." This remains a familiar sight today.
Trailer-on-flatcar service, as we think of it today, was not in-
augurated until 1926. It was instituted by the Chicago, North Shore
and Milwaukee Railway as a means of competing more effectively
with water and highway carriers between Chicago and Milwaukee.
The operation consisted of picking up less-than-carload 5 shipments at
the shipper's door, in trailers provided by or operated for the railroad
The trailers were then loaded aboard flatcars, transported at railroad
rates and on railroad bills of lading, and ultimately delivered to the
store door of the consignee.° In 1932 the North Shore expanded its
operations in this area by inaugurating service for over-the-road'
motor carriers at an attractive rate. Similar service was adopted by
the Chicago and Alton (now the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio) in the same
year, but was terminated a year later as an unprofitable venture.'
The Chicago and Great Western established piggyback service in
1936, and in 1937 the transportation of trailers between Chicago and
Galesbury, Illinois was begun by the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
as part of its trucking operations conducted by the Burlington Trans-
portation Company. This service is still in existence today. Also in
the year 1937, the New 'York, New Haven and Hartford began its
piggyback service between New York and Boston, Springfield and
Providence. Adoption by the Rock Island Line and the Denver and
Rio Grande Western followed in 1938. 9
Despite this fairly rapid and extensive adoption of piggyback in
3 Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail 293 I.C.C. 93, 94 (1954).
7 John G. Shott, Piggyback and the Future of Railroad Transportation, Pub. Aft.
Inst., Washington, D.C. (1960).
6 This term has no technical significance; it is simply used to describe shipments
that take up less space than an entire single vehicle of carriage.
6 Supra note 3, at 95.
7 Over-the-road service (also called line-haul service) is a phrase which defies
definition with any degree of exactness, but for the neophyte in the area of transporta-
tion, it may be said to refer to carriage which is outside the terminal area. The latter
phrase presents much the same definitional problems. One author, while recognizing
this difficulty, has defined the phrase, relative to its use in this article, as follows:
The Motor Carrier Act does not define the term "terminal area," and neither
does it have any definite generally accepted meaning which can be applied in any
particular case In a general way, the term, as applied to rail carriers, suggests
that area adjacent to a carrier's station within which bona fide transfer, col-
lection or delivery services as distinguished from line-haul services, are per-
formed either free or for a charge.
Kahn, Principles of Motor Carrier Regulation 20 (1958).
8 Ry. Age, Nov. 4, 1950.
9 Shott, supra note 4.
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its very early years, it has been only within the past decade that the
concept has fully matured into a major factor in freight transporta-
tion?' A number of reasons could be assigned to explain this "ado-
lescent gap" in the growth of piggyback. At least one of these was
the regulatory problem, both local and national, inherent in any
attempt to integrate diverse and adverse transportation systems.
Another equally significant reason was the necessity of gearing this
concept to a large and diversified industrial complex, without which
the present day demand for piggyback service could not be sustained.
Whatever the obstacles may have been, an honest evaluation of the
competing interests to be served not only obviates a detailed discus-
sion of them, but indicates the overriding advantages which make the
piggyback concept so mutually beneficial to these interests." The
patent attraction of piggyback is, of course, the integration of the
motor carrier's flexibility" with those advantages inherent in railroad
operations. This was aptly recognized as early as 1926 by the Electric
Railway Journal when commenting on the Chicago, North Shore and
Milwaukee's TOFC service:
The great saving of time and expense in handling shipments
make this new equipment an outstanding contribution to
the development of freight transportation. The trailers elim-
inate all extra handling of shipments, being loaded at the
point of departure and unloaded at their destination. The
trailers will be hauled by motor truck to a central loading
station, where they will be mounted on flatcars. Deliveries
of the trailers will be made in similar manner to all parts
of the cities embraced in this new type of service."
10 For an excellent discussion of these recent developments and the expectations in
this area, see John G. Shott, Progress in Piggyback and Containerization, Pub. Aff. Inst.,
Washington, D.C. (1961). See also 74th Annual Report of the ICC 78-79 (1960).
11 See the address by L. K. Sillcox before the Canadian Railway Club on April 13,
1959, wherein he enumerated the material contributions which piggyback rates should
make to the financial welfare of the railroads by:
(1) commanding profitable traffic which cannot be attracted in any other known
manner;
(2) making possible the gradual elimination of vastly costly time-consuming
utterly wasteful terminal services;
(3) arresting the further inroads of external competition on high class traffic
and enable the railways to give a complete and scheduled service such as
the shipping public now demands; and
(4) providing a flexible coordinated service in the public interest.
12 Ibid.
Highway transportation possesses flexibility to a degree which can never be
matched by conventional railway methods and this more flexible, as well as
complete, service has many attractions to the shipping public.
13 68 Elec. Ry. J. 892 (1926).
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Perhaps the most important single development in this field to date
is the recent decision in Eastern Cent.•Motor Carriers Ass'n, Inc. v.
Baltimore & O. R.R." This decision not only eliminated various
legal barriers but, in effect, placed the ICC stamp of approval on the
five basic piggyback plans of operation!'
THE FIVE BASIC PLANS
The present Plan IV is arbitrary in its design.'° Plans I, II and
V basically constitute the three types of transportation available under
Parts I and II of the Interstate Commerce Act" when these two parts
are truly coordinated. Plan I is a substituted rail for motor service.
Plan V covers the situation where a motor-rail or rail-motor joint rate
is used. Under. Plan II, the railroad furnishes the entire service,
utilizing its so-called "terminal exemptionm° for pickup and delivery
services, and possibly using its motor carrier service for a portion of
the rail haul. It is only under Plans III and IV that a variation from
strict coordination between motor and rail is encountered. Mile
both depend upon through routing, they contemplate only the offering
of a rail service.
14 I.C.C. Docket No. 32533, decided June 19, 1961; hereinafter referred to by
docket number only.
15 There is no theoretical reason why there are only five basic plans. There cer-
tainly can be more such plans and in all probability there soon will be. Quite recently,
a protest was voiced that a proposed plan should be designated Plan II %. (See Traffic
World, Dec. 2, 1961.) It should also be noted that in Docket No. 32533, there were
additional plans proposed that did not fit within the framework of the five plans given
formal approval by the Commission.
16 While Plans I, II, III and V can be traced through the discussion that follows,
Plan IV cannot be.. Morris Forgash of the United States Freight Company, speaking
before the National Petroleum Association on April 15, 1959, stated that he did not
know how Plan IV had evolved; this author also has been unable to trace its exact
evolution.
17 The Interstate Commerce Act is divided into four parts:
Part I, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 US.C. §* 1-27 (1958), governs rail
carriage; Part II, 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1}§ 301-27 (1958), popu-
larly known as the Motor Carrier Act, regulates that area of transportation; Part III,
54 Stat. 929 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 11 901-23 (1958), governs water carriers;
and Part IV, 56 Stat. 284 (1942), as amended, 49 U.S.C. IR 1001-22 (1958), encom-
passes freight forwarders.
It should be noted here that, for purposes of clarification, the sections of the act
have been numbered to correspond with the part in which they are found. Thus, sec-
tions I to 199 appear in Part I, sections in the 200 series in Part II, etc.
15 Section 202(c), 49 Stat. 543, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 302(c) (1958), states that
the provisions of Part II shall not apply:
. . . to transportation by motor vehicle by a carrier by railroad subject to
[Part I] ... incidental to transportation or service subject to [Part I] in the
performance within terminal areas of transfer, collection, or delivery services;
but such transportation shall be considered to be and shall be regulated as
transportation subject to [Part I] when performed by such carrier by rail-




Undei this plan, , motor vehicle traffic moves from point of origin
to destination under a single bill of lading issued by a single motor
carrier, and under a single factor rate published in a motor carrier
tariff, which provides for substitution of rail for motor transportation
for a portion of the haul. This substituted service is performed at
the option of the motor carrier for all or a portion of the haul between
rail terminals. The railroad's only function is to move the loaded
trailers on flatcars between rail heads. The motor carrier receives its
published transportation charge from the shipper and remits to the
participating rail carrier an unpublished division of the single factor,
motor carrier rate. As an alternative, the railroad rate might consist
of a flat charge per trailer. Since, as above indicated, the traffic moves
on motor carrier billing, the rail service, as such, is not held out to
the public.
Plan II
Plan II involves a complete service offered by the railroad, which
provides the trailers and flatcars; the transportation, loading and
unloading of the same; plus a door-to-door service for shippers and
consignees within the terminal areas where the railroad has stations
and provides conventional rail service. The usual practice under Plan
II is for the railroad to place its own trailers in convenient' locations
for loading by the shipper, and then to move the trailers by tractor
to ramps for loading on flatcars. The entire service is under railroad
tariffs, on a single bill of lading, with rates generally geared to motor
common carrier rates. While this is the normally offered Plan II
service, it may also be possible for the railroad to utilize its own motor
carriers in a line-haul capacity, under a substituted service arrange-
ment.
Plan III
Under Plan III, the railroad's function is simply to load the
trailers onto its flatcars at the terminal, transport the trailers on flat-
cars, and unload them at the destination terminal. The shipper pro-
vides the trailers, which it either owns or leases, and performs all
delivery services at both rail terminals. For purposes of piggyback,
the controlling carriage is on the flatcar, i.e., railroad billing at rail-
road rates. The additional services, including the loading and unload-
ing of the trailers, are reflected in such tariffs.
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Plan IV
Plan IV service is almost identical with that of Plan III The
only difference is that the shipper provides the flatcar, which must be
fitted with the necessary tie-down devices, subject to railroad approval.
Plan V
Plan V consists of transportation in combined motor and rail
movements under joint, through motor-rail rates, with established
divisions of revenue between the participating carriers. Both carriers
perform line-haul movements. Under this plan, the initial movement
from point of manufacture or assembly may be by either rail or motor
service of the participating carriers. Thus, the rates may cover motor-
rail-motor; rail-motor-rail; rail-motor; or motor-rail. The railroad
performs ramp-to-ramp piggyback service between points that are
definitely specified in the routing provisions of the applicable tariffs.
Some tariffs may have proportional application, under which the
transported vehicles must move, by unspecified means, beyond the
termination point of the joint rate in order to enjoy such a rate.
THE LAW AND ITS PROBLEMS
For two dissimilar forms of transportation to be integrated into a
unitized system, the law governing the participating systems must also
be integrated. Piggyback, involving as it does rail and motor carriage
in a combined effort, is precisely an integration of two unlike forms
of transportation into a single fabric. However, under Parts I and II
of the Interstate Commerce Act, rail and motor carriage are sepa-
rately treated. The effect of this dichotomy is the creation of a num-
ber of regulatory problems which become increasingly complex in
direct proportion to the number of piggyback plans developed, and
the degree of variation in the existing plans. The interrelation of all
of these factors also makes categorization of the subject matter diffi-
cult, if not impossible. Thus, for a better understanding of the prob-
lem areas to be discussed herein, the chameleon-like character of the
plans themselves, the overlapping of subject matter, and the conse-
quent impracticability of sharply delineating the various issues, should
be kept in mind. It should also become apparent during the discussion
which follows that a significant application of coalescent thought has
yet to be made in most of these problem areas. One result of this
failure is that the entire concept of piggyback is in more of a state
of upheaval than is ordinarily the case under the usual conception of
administrative regulation, in which there is an essentially dynamic
character, unfettered by the absoluteness of an unchanging approach
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to the problems before it. A second result is that the need becomes
even more acute for some exploration of the problems in this vital area
of transportation, and the theories underlying those problems. As a
practical matter, this article will deal mostly with the existing piggy-
back plans by fitting them into the framework of presently existing
principles. No attempt will be made to anticipate all the ramifications
of the field, nor will all the mechanical and/or technical aspects'" of
the five plans be discussed. The element of competition is likewise
beyond the scope of this article, but, though not a subject for discus-
sion, it should nonetheless be recognized as one of the major determi-
nants in deciding whether or not to propose a particular plan. Illus-
trative of the role which competition may play is the Nat'l Auto.
Transp'rs Ass'n Petition for Declaratory Order?' In that case, the
Association sought a ruling which, if favorable, would have allowed
them to interchange with railroads under Plans I, III and V at points
which the motor carriers were not authorized to serve, although they
were authorized to serve the route from origin to destination. The
competitive undertone is apparent in the hearing examiner's con-
clusion:
Actually, what has happened is that motor carriers special-
izing in the transportation of new motor vehicles have lost a
substantial amount of business to the railroads as a result
of the establishment by the latter of lower rates for the
movement of the traffic. In an attempt to salvage some of
their portion of the business, the motor carriers are here
seeking blanket authority to institute new services, totally
different from those previously performed, and without re-
gard to the long-established services of other carriers or the
need for the new service sought to be instituted.'
The entire field of piggyback can perhaps best be understood
when approached initially from the railroad's point of view. This is
especially so because, when looked at in one sense, the basic legal
18 For additional information on such points, see the Code of Rules Governing the
Interchange of, Repairs to, and Settlement for, Trailers and Containers Used in Trailer-
on-Flatcar (TOFC) Service, published by the Association of American Railroads, effec-
tive Jan. I, 1961.
Another facet of the legal complex not to be discussed is the cost - rate structure,
which was an early obstacle to piggyback's development. The continuing significance
of this issue was aptly illustrated in the Rail-Trailer publication, Trailers-on-Flat-Cars
(I.C.C. Cat. No. HE-2313. RI). A question and answer exchange therein leaves little
doubt that rail and motor's mutual apprehension over their rate structures is still a
major factor to be considered.
20 M.C.C.-3024, July 20, 1961.
21 Id. at 8.
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conflicts arose as a result of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act,
which altered the status of railroad owned motor carriers, as well as
the relationship of the railroad to motor carriage itself. Prior to the
passage of this legislation in 1935, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion exercised jurisdiction only over motor carriers operated by and/or
for railroads in conjunction with terminal services?' The Motor
Carrier Act did not purport to alter such jurisdiction 2 3 However, it
did nothing to alleviate the difficulty of distinguishing between a line-
haul service, now regulated under Part II, and a terminal service,
specifically exempt from Part II and thus still regulated under Part
I.24
 The pickup and delivery services offered at both terminals are
examples of the "202(c) exemption" 25 under the second piggyback
plan. That plan contemplates that these services will be within the
terminal areas and thus subject to Part I. The exemption is applicable
to carload as well as less-than-carload shipments. The latter also
pertains to a motor carrier's use of terminal areas?'
One of the major areas of conflict, already alluded to, arose be-
cause of the nature of the Motor Carrier Act itself. Cast in the form
of a separate statute, the act made no attempt to distinguish railroad
owned motor carriers from motor carriers generally, during a period
of increased railroad activity in this field. This legislative duality was
succinctly described in a 1939 Senate hearing:
While railroads, motor carriers, and water carriers are all
engaged in transportation, they function, operate and do
business in general in very different ways, and any sound
system of regulation must recognize, and be adjusted to,
these differences. When the Motor Carrier Act-1935—Part
II of the Interstate Commerce Act—was proposed, , the plan
of interlarding the new regulation with the old regulation of
Part I was considered and rejected. The danger of tamper-
ing with the provisions of Part I which had undergone so
22 See, e.g., Tariffs Embracing Motor-Truck or Wagon Transfer Services, 91 I.C.C.
539, 547 (1924), wherein the Commission stated that it had "no jurisdiction over the
line-haul rates of motor-truck companies operated as an extension of the lines of mil
or water carriers."
23 Part II contains provisions in section 202(c), 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1958), and in section 203(14), 49 Stat. 544 (1935), as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 303(14) (1958), which exclude from regulation transportation by motor
vehicle of a railroad, which transportation is subject to Part I.
24 In Tariffs Embracing Motor-Truck or Wagon Transfer Services, supra note 22,
the Commission expressed concern over the fact that "in many cases it is difficult to
distinguish between a line-haul service and a terminal service." This difficulty persists
today. See also Coordination of Motor Transp., 182 I.C.C. 263, 367-68 (1932).
25 Supra note 18.
28 See Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail, 293 I.C.C. 93, 102-03 (1954).
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much litigation and court interpretation was realized, and it
also seemed desirable that the motor carriers should have a
statute of their own which would define their duties and re-
sponsibilities and the jurisdiction of the Commission over
them. . . 27
In the light of this legislative duality, Section 206 (Part II) of
the Interstate Commerce Ace should be considered. This section, in
effect, requires that all motor carriers subject to the provisions of Part
II must obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity. Since the
railroads were already engaged in line-haul motor carriage when Part
II became law, a jurisdictional problem was created as to whether
Parts I or II should govern when this line-haul motor service was sub-
stituted for rail service. This conflict prompted the Commission, on
its own motion, to investigate the lawfulness of railroad tariff rules
and practices in this area in the Substituted Freight Service case."
Both the substitution of motor for rail service and rail for motor
service were considered. The ICC decided that neither the motor
carrier nor the rail carrier could substitute the other mode of carriage
for line-haul movements until the certificate requirements of both
Parts I and II were satisfied. This same construction was also applied
to the tariff provisions.
Compliance with the certification requirements was not the only
major holding. Also of great significance was the finding that sub-
stituted service, where it consists of a combination of line-haul move-
ments by rail or motor, is to be treated as a "joint service," despite
what other name it may have been called3° Further, the Commission
realized that the entire problem was not before it:
It may also be that, after this service is brought into con-
formity with the tariff and certificate provisions of the act,
mixed questions of law and fact will arise whether the prac-
tices in connection therewith are reasonable, nondiscrim-
inatory, or otherwise lawful. ..
In defining these outer limits, i.e., that the practices be reasonable,
27 Testimony of Commissioner Joseph B. Eastman, Senate Hearings on Transporta-
tion Act of 1939, April 3-14, 1939, p. 787.
29 49 Stat. 551 (1935), as amended, 49 	 1306 (1958).
29 232 I.C.C. 683 (1939).
80 Id. at 686. An argument can be made as to the accuracy of the phrase "joint
service" if it means joint rate, and if it applied before passage of Part II of the act.
See, e.g., Cary v. Eureka Springs Ry., 7 I.C.C. 286 (1897) ; Wylie v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
11 I.C.C. 145 (1905) ; Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. Hamburg-American Packing Co.,
13 I.C.C. 266 (1908).
31 Substituted Freight Service, supra note 29, at 686.
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nondiscriminatory and lawful, the ICC was reinforcing a problemati-
cal approach begun three years earlier in a case involving the Great
Western Railroad Company. 32
 In that instance, the railroad had be-
gun operating under a joint rate arrangement whereby trailers were
loaded aboard railroad flatcars and transported via rail over the rail
portion of the joint route. In effect, this service was tantamount to
the presently approved Plan V. During the hearing, the Commission
examined the adequacy of the contemplated division and the lawful-
ness of the proposed rate under Part I, section 133
 Part II, section
216(c) ;" the possible discriminatory effects under Part I, sections
2" and 3" and Part II, section 216(d) j 37
 and the "section 4" (Part
I) problem." The results were strikingly similar to those reached in
the Substituted Freight Service case, for throughout the discussion
and comparison of the Parts I and II provisions, there was no state-
ment as to how, if at all, they were interrelated. As a result, the rail
and motor provisions were considered and ruled upon as separate
requirements. It is unfortunate that the Commission sidestepped this
problem of legislative duality because it would have obviated the con-
flict in the Substituted Freight Service case. The jurisdictional issue
was certainly before it since Part I, section 4 has no counterpart under
the Motor Carrier Act (Part II), and the parties to the proceeding
earnestly pressed this point upon the Commission, due in part at least
to the fact that section 4 is quite famous within this area of the law,
possessing a vibrant history of case law and amendments. Very
briefly, the section 4 problem (commonly referred to as -such) is
aimed at the discrimination which arises when a railroad charges more
for hauling a shorter distance than for a like haul of a longer distance
over the same route. In resolving this problem the Commission stated:
While section 4 does not apply to the charges of motor com-
mon carriers, when such a carrier joins in a through route
and joint rates with a railroad it becomes a participant with
the railroad in a movement which is subject to that section.
Motor common carriers are not required to join with rail
carriers in such routes and rates but, having voluntarily
entered into such a joint arrangement, the motor carrier
assumes obligations similar to those of the participating rail
32 Motor-Rail-Motor Traffic in East and Midwest, 219 I.C.C. 245 (1936).
33 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1 (1958).
34 49 Stat. 558 (1935), as amended, 49 US.C. 316(c) (1958).
88 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. I 2 (1958).
38 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 3 (1958).
37 49 Stat. 558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 316(d) (1958).
88 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 4 (1958).
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carrier in observance of the provisions of section 4. In the
instances last described and which protestants claim would
be in violation of section 4, it is apparent that the departures
are due to the circuity of respondents' routes and the fact
that the rates are made the same as the highway rates. We
have frequently authorized relief to circuitous all-rail routes
to meet the motor-competitive rates of direct rail routes from
and to the same points. We are of the opinion that similar
relief is justified here."
However this decision may have satisfied the case at hand, like the
Substituted Freight Service case, it certainly failed to promulgate any
basic policy of the Commission's jurisdiction over joint rates, that is,
whether Part I, II or a combination of both apply. It is difficult to
ascertain what, if any, effect these basic unanswered questions have
had on the development of Plan V (the joint rate as it is usually
thought of)." The fact remains, however, that Plan V has not as yet
been widely adopted."
Closely associated with the problems of legislative duality are
those which arise in connection with the certification of railroad owned
motor carriers. Although all interstate carriers must obtain an ICC
certificate of convenience and necessity in order to initiate or continue
operations, Part II, section 206, 42 requiring such certification, does
not distinguish railroad owned motor carriers from motor carriers
generally. In seeking certification under this section, the railroads,
which were already engaged in extensive motor carrier operations
39 Supra note 32, at 272.
There is some thinking that the section 4 problem is avoided since joint rates which
exceed the aggregate of intermediate rates are prima facie unreasonable under Part II
of the act. See Kingan & Co. v. Olson Transp. Co., 32 M.C.C. 10 (1942); Victory
Granite Co. v. Central Truck Lines, Inc., 44 M.C.C. 320 (1945).
40 By way of explanation, since a joint rate is a single factor rate, the compensation
of each carrier is arrived at by dividing the rate between them. This is referred to in
the act as a "division." Forgetting Commissioner Eastman's statement (see text ac-
companying note 27 supra) for just a moment, Part I, section 15(6), 24 Stat. 284 (1887),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. 15(6) (1958), should be compared with Part II, section 216(f),
49 Stat. 558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316(f) (1958). Although space limitations
prevent the full text from being set out here, a reading of the two sections will indicate
the significant differences in the language employed therein. This author's extensive
research into case law, legislative history, ICC studies and coordinator's work papers,
has been unable to turn up any reason for this difference in language. It has been said
that "no determination has been made as yet of how far the Commission may go in
applying the 'standards' of part I to the issues which arise under part II." (Practices
of Motor Carriers of Property in the Division of Revenue on Joint Hauls, Statement
451, p. 265.) This is an accurate summation of the presently existing dilemma.
41 74th Annual Report of the ICC 80 (1960).
42 Supra note 28, and text following same.
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when the Motor Carrier Act became law, have been met with policy
considerations often working to their disadvantage. This is so because
the ICC and the courts have come to the conclusion that Congress has
expressed a strong policy against railroad incursions into the motor
carrier field. A general expression of this policy is said to be found
in the National Transportation Policy" which commands recognition
and preservation of the inherent advantages of all modes of trans-
portation. More particularly, the congressional attitude is said to be
reflected in Part I, Section 5(2) (b) of the Interstate Commerce
Act" which contains a proviso specifically applicable to railroad
acquisitions of a motor carrier:
. . . Provided, That if a carrier by railroad subject to this
chapter, or any person which is controlled by such a carrier,
or affiliated therewith . . . is an applicant in the case of any
such proposed transaction involving a motor carrier, the
Commission shall not enter such an order unless it finds that
the transaction proposed will be consistent with the public
interest and will enable such carrier to use service by motor
vehicle to public advantage in its operations and will not
unduly restrain competition."
The Commission has concluded that the National Transportation
Policy requires that these section 5 standards be followed as a general
rule in all other situations. Thus, these standards must be satisfied
by the successful (railroad) applicant for a certificate of convenience
and necessity under Part II, section 206."
To reflect this policy of opposition to railroad incursions into
the field of motor carrier service, the ICC has developed five condi-
tions, which are written into certificates issued to railroad owned
motor carriers. These are commonly referred to, in the collective
sense, as the auxiliary or supplemental conditions, this general label
being derived from the first condition. Very briefly, the conditions
are as follows:
1. The character of the service is limited to that which is auxil-
iary to or supplemental of the rail service of the railroad. A good
example is the substituted service discussed earlier."
43 Preamble to Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act.
44 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 4 5(2)(b) (1958).
45 Ibid.
46 See Kansas City So. Transp. Co., Corn. Car. Application, 10 M.C.C. 221 (1938) ;
United States v. Rock Island Transit Co., 340 U.S. 419 (1951).
47
 For an excellent discussion of the reasons for the insertion of this condition,
see Kansas City So. Transp. Co., supra note 46.
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2. The authorized service is restricted to points that are stations
on the rail lines of the railroad.
3. Transportation of shipments by motor vehicle between so-
called key points is generally prohibited. These key points are named
in the certificate itself and are occasionally subject to revision.
4. All contractual arrangements between the carrier and the rail-
road must be reported to the ICC and be subject to revision as found
necessary, in order that such arrangements will be fair and equitable
to the parties. 48
5. The Commission generally reserves the right to make such
further changes or modifications in the conditions of the certificate as
may be necessary to insure that the motor carrier service is auxiliary
to or supplemental of the rail service.
In order to be relieved from the imposition of any of the above con-
ditions, the applicant has the burden of showing that the public interest
will be promoted thereby.°
In the recently decided Docket No. 32533, 60 which dealt mainly
with Plans III and IV, the ICC made the following observation with
respect to other services:
Other services. Several railroads . . . have performed for
freight forwarders the loading and unloading of lading into
and out of trailers moved in plan III and plan IV service.
Several [other] railroads . . . have leased either directly or
indirectly through subsidiaries trailers or flexi vans on a trip
lease basis to shippers including freight forwarders and ship-
per associations. In addition, some railroads . . . either
directly or indirectly through subsidiaries, perform the cart-
age of trailers between the shippers' places of business and
the railroads' ramp locations. The railroads have found that
the utilization of their trailers in plan III service through
trip lease arrangements has had the effect of reducing their
empty trailer miles, as it enables the "interweaving" of plan
II and plan III trailer utilization. The reduction results prin-
cipally because the railroads, including their subsidiaries,
generally lease only their surplus trailers, and . . . only to
48 Ibid.
49 See American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 364 U.S. 1 (1960). For instances
where conditions have been relieved upon a proper showing, see American Trucking
Ass'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 141 (1957) ; H. C. Gabler, Inc. Extension-Cement from
Mo. and Pa. Counties, I.C.C. Docket No. MC-27817 (Sub. 35), decided August 1, 1961.
60 Eastern Cent. Motor Carriers Ass'n, Inc. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., I.C.C. Docket
No. 32533, decided June 19, 1961.
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shippers desiring to make use of the trailers to destinations
at which the [railroad] wants them."
The Commission did not decide the legality of these proposed "addi-
tional services." Instead, it stated:
While potential unjust discrimination, in certain circum-
stances, might be found the potentiality is inherent in the
nature of the tariff publication, and may not rest alone on
speculation. In other words, we cannot find that plans III
and IV, openly published and available without collateral
qualification to all shippers at the same location are unjustly
discriminatory because the opportunity exists for the car-
riers, outside of the tariffs, to engage in criminal rebating."
The major significance of the above decision is that the Commission
did not specifically condemn the offering of the additional services.
In the prior case of Black Diamond Transp. Co., 53 ICC Division
1 ruled upon a variation in a proposed Plan II service. It seems that
the applicant trucking company was a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Lehigh Valley Railroad (Lehigh). The trucking company sought
motor carrier authority to move between various piggyback loading fa-
cilities in order to provide, in effect, for a central terminal loading
facility for these trailers, instead of requiring the railroad to utilize vari-
ous scattered terminals. The variation in the case consisted of the fact
that the applicant agreed to the insertion of the above-noted conditions
in its certificate since, as it claimed, all that was being offered was a
substituted service over points in the line already served by the rail-
road. The American Trucking Association (ATA) objected, claiming
that, even if the five conditions were imposed in the certificate, they
would not afford sufficient protection to existing carriers. The ICC
rejected this argument and concluded:
Authority to provide such a service, as noted, allows a rail-
road to transport rail traffic by truck, and allows the public
to enjoy the benefits of improved rail service through the use
of trucks instead of trains as a means of fulfilling the rail-
road's undertaking to transport. There is no showing here
that the piggyback service which the Lehigh wishes to insti-
tute would be a substitute for service that it is now provid-
ing. It is not rendering piggyback service at the considered
51 Id. at 14-15.
52 Id. at 57.




points nor is piggyback service something that a rail carrier
is obligated to render. In addition, the Lehigh has not shown
that it is transporting to these points traffic by rail of a type
which would be susceptible to handling in piggyback service
and which could be more economically and efficiently
handled in that way than it is at present. The Lehigh's sug-
gestion that operating economics could be effected through
use of applicant's proposed service relates solely to a pro-
jected piggyback movement. Granted that if the Lehigh
instituted piggyback service, it could do so more econom-
ically through use of a single, centrally located loading ramp
than it could through the construction of loading facilities
at each station, however, there is still no showing that
through use of applicant's services existing rail service will
be improved. We conclude that the application should be
denied."
It should be noted that here too the decision was in no way contrary
to the theory of the proposed service.
The above discussion indicates only some of the problems which
may arise in conjunction with a railroad's operation of its own motor
carrier, along with piggyback service. The importance of understand-
ing the reasons for and the limits of certificates of railroad owned
motor carriers is simply that, as illustrated in Docket No. 32533,
various railroads have proposed modifications to the five plans by
utilizing their own motor carriers. Furthermore, as indicated by the
Commission's holding in the Black Diamond case, it seems to be
theoretically possible under Plan II for a railroad to perform a por-
tion of the rail leg of a piggyback service by wholly owned motor
carrier. If the dicta in the Substituted Freight Service case means
that substituted motor for rail is really joint service, meaning joint
rate,' and if the Black Diamond case had been decided favorably to
the applicant, then the railroad would have been engaged in joint
service with its wholly owned carrier, combined with the terminal area
service. The situation might be even more involved in instances where
a railroad's motor carrier is authorized, under section 206, to perform
so-called "peddle service."5°
Returning to the problem of joint rates as such, Part II, Section
54 Id. at 214-15.
55 See Substituted Freight Service, 232 I.C.C. 683, 688 (1939).
56 This is the phrase used to describe a truck run with more than one delivery en
route. See American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 141 (1957).
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216(c) of the Interstate Commerce Act" pertains specifically to rail-
motor joint rates. This section provides in part:
Common carriers of property by motor vehicle may
establish reasonable through routes and joint rates, charges,
and classifications with other such carriers or with common
carriers by railroad . and common carriers of passenger
by motor vehicle may establish reasonable through routes
and joint rates, fares, or charges with common carriers by
railroad. . . .
This section should be compared with section 1(4) of Part I," which
provides as follows:
It shall be the duty of every common carrier subject to
this chapter to provide and furnish transportation upon
reasonable request therefor, and to establish reasonable
through routes with other such carriers, and just and reason-
able rates, fares and charges, and classifications applicable
thereto. . . . It shall be the duty of every common carrier
establishing through routes to provide reasonable rules and
regulations with respect to the operation, and providing for
reasonable compensation to those entitled thereto; and in
case of joint rates, fares, or charges, to establish just, reason-
able, and equitable divisions thereof, which shall not unduly
prefer or prejudice any of such participating carriers.
Patent differences between the two are that the latter section applies
only to carriers subject to Part I, but is mandatory, while the former
section applies to both motor carriers and railroads, but is permissive.
These distinctions were clearly illustrated in Ringsby Truck Lines,
Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry." In that case, a truck line sued a
railroad alleging that the latter had violated section 1(4) by refusing
to establish reasonable rates and charges, provide reasonable facilities
and make reasonable rules and regulations for the transportation of
loaded and empty semi-trailers. It was contemplated that the motor
carrier would perform a portion of the trip over the road and arrange
for the rail carrier to perform the remainder. The Commission stated:
The arrangement desired to be maintained by com-
plainant [motor carrier] is for a joint motor-carrier and rail-
carrier service for shippers. There is, however, no provision
57 49 Stat. 558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316(c) (1958).
58 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(4) (1958).
50 263 I.C.C. 139 (1954).
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in section 1 of part I of the act for establishment by rail
carriers of joint rates with motor carriers; section 216 of
part H authorizes common carriers by motor vehicle to enter
into joint rates with common carriers by rail, but establish-
ment of such rates is not a requirement of any provision of
that part of the act.'
An important extension of this "permissiveness" took place in
the case of Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail," where the Com-
mission was faced with the delicate problem of whether a railroad,
engaged in TOFC service under joint rate arrangements with some
motor common carriers, could refuse to establish such arrangements
with other motor common carriers, equally eligible under the law to
participate in such arrangements. Relying on section 216(c), the
Commission answered in the affirmative and stated:
While it [section 216(c)] provides that motor carriers
may enter into such rates with rail . . . carriers, it does not
require their establishment; and the provisions of section
3(4) of the act, prohibiting discrimination as between con-
necting carriers, has no application to carriers subject to part
II of the act."
Perhaps the most comprehensive handling of the legislative dual-
ity problem to date occurred in this same case of Movement of High-
way Trailers by Rail. The Commission issued a declaratory order
resolving twelve of twenty questions submitted for review. Of major
significance was the affirmative finding that a railroad may transport
its own freight (i.e., freight tendered it by shippers for movement by
rail, on railroad bills of lading, at railroad rates) in its own trailers
on flatcars, subject only to Part I. The legal ramification of this find-
ing is that TOFC service is not motor vehicle transportation, but
strictly transportation by rail involving no motor carriage, line-haul
movement. Thus, the transporting vehicle is the flatcar, a component
part of the train; the trailer serves only as a container; and the way
60 Id. at 141.
on 293 I.C.C. 93 (1954).
62 Id. at 105. Section 3(4) of the act, 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 3(4) (1958), is similar in scope and effect to section 1(4) and provides:
All carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter shall . . . afford all
reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between
their respective lines and connecting lines, and for receiving, forwarding, and
delivery of passengers or property to and from connecting lines; and shall not
discriminate in their rates, fares, and charges between connecting lines in the
distribution of traffic that is not specifically routed by the shipper.
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being traversed is a private railroad right-of-way, not a public high-
way."
A correlative problem dealt with in this case was the prior or
subsequent highway movement incident to a piggyback or TOFC
service. The question was asked whether a railroad, under provisions
of tariffs duly filed and published, may transport freight-laden trailers
on flatcars, without authority under Part II, when the trailers have
had a prior or subsequent highway movement (a) by private carrier,
or (b) by contract carrier. The Commission answered part (a) in the
affirmative, but considered the situation somewhat different as far as
contract carriers were concerned. It held that "a contract carrier
may not utilize trailer-on-flatcar service to obtain transportation
within the scope of its (the contract carrier's) permit."" The Com-
mission reasoned that a contract carrier performs a service for its
portion under a contract which contemplates the rendition of motor
service. Thus, to substitute TOFC movement in lieu of over-the-road
service would constitute a breach of this contract. The substitution
of one medium of transportation for another also constitutes a breach
of the bill of lading contract with the shipper unless the shipper is
appraised of such optional substitution of service by an appropriate
tariff provision. Furthermore, a contract carrier is under an addi-
tional disability in its relations with common carriers, since it may
not engage in interchange with common carriers—interchange being
appropriate only as between common carriers." However, the Com-.
mission did recognize that there is a distinction between transportation
within the territorial scope of the contract carrier's permit and that
beyond the scope of said permit: "... a contract carrier may, as agent
for the shipper, arrange for such transportation beyond the territorial
limits of its permit.'
SOME STATUTORY RISKS INVOLVED
With reference to the aforementioned variations of Plans III and
IV, tendered by certain of the railroad parties to Docket No. 32533,"
the ICC in that proceeding referred generally to the opportunity for
rebating, and more specifically, to the Elkins Act." Although a de-
tailed discussion of the Elkins Act" is unnecessary here, it should
be noted that it applies to:
63 Supra note 61, at 97-101.
64 Id. at 104.
65 Id. at 109.
66 Id. at 104.
67 Supra note 15.
68 Supra note 50, at 57.
69 32 Stat. 847 (1903), as amended, 49 U.S.C. H 41 -43 (1958).
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Every person or corporation, whether carrier or shipper, who
shall, knowingly, offer, grant, or give, or solicit, accept, or
receive any such rebates . . . . 70
It is also interesting to note how broadly the act has been construed
by the courts. The following statement is illustrative of its con-
struction:
The purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act and the Elkins
Act was to outlaw every subterfuge, plan, scheme, or device
formulated by or participated in by any person or corporation
to give rebates, concessions, advantages, and discriminations
to shippers in respect to interstate transportation by carriers
subject to the Elkins Act and the statutes were designed
to strike down every device without exception no matter how
ingenious or labyrinthian, by which these objections are
sought to be accomplished. These statutes are intended to
strike through all forms, pretenses, and subterfuges to reach
and eradicate the forbidden evil."'
Several of the railroads in Docket No. 32533 offered Plan II and
Plan III service. Also, as indicated," some were (and are) tendering
additional services to be performed by the railroad's motor carriers
along with Plan III service. Some of the tendered service is very simi-
lar to that under Plan II, except that the trailers are leased to the
shippers. Without pretending to exhaust any and all the various
ramifications that might arise under Parts I and/or II of the Interstate
Commerce Act—for example, the effect of the service on other modes
of transportation under the mandate of the National Transportation
Policy—as a rule of thumb, one should always check whether or not
the tariffs reflect all the services offered, as provided in Sections 6(7)"
and 217(b) i4 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
The following statements accurately reflect ICC thinking on
sections 6(7) and 217(b), and disclose that they are liberally inter-
preted. The former section was discussed in Baltimore & 0. R.R. v.
United States, where the Court stated:
It is immaterial that the shipper pays fair value or the market
price for the extra privilege he enjoys. Section 6(7) of the
Act forbids the carrier to receive less than the published rates
72 32 Stat. 847 (1903), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 410) (1958).
71 United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 173 F. Supp. 397, 412 (S.D. Iowa 1959).
72 Supra note 15.
73 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 6(7) (1958).
74 49 Stat. 560 (1939), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 317(b) (1958).
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for transportation or to remit "by any 'device any portion of
the rates." When services, not necessary for transportation,
are furnished below cost in an effort to acquire rail transpor-
tation, as was done here, this provision is violated."
Section 217 (b) was clarified in ICC v. North Pier Terminal Co."
There the court stated:
Sec. 217(a) requires a "[filing] with the Commission ... [of]
tariffs showing all the rates....for . . . all services." True, it
might be said the section comprehends charges by, instead of
payments by,•the carriers. So we go on to sec. 217 (b) which
provides that the carrier shall not receive a "less or different
compensation for transportation . . . between the points
enumerated in such tariff than the rates . . . specified in the
tariffs . . . and no such carrier shall refund or remit in any
manner or by any device, directly or indirectly, or through
any agent, or broker, or otherwise, any portion of the
rates . . ." When Congress in the language just quoted
went to such great lengths to cover all conceivable situations
which a carrier's ingenuity in solving situations might devise,
we can not construe such language to require the rebate or
refund to be the one making the original payment—the
shipper. Probably such rebate is usually in fact made to the
shipper. Here it was not. If Congress had intended to limit
proscribed rebates to shipper, it could easily have so stated.
Instead, it seemed bent on travelling in the other direction—
away from narrowing restricted or condemned rebates."
CONCLUSION
The logical conclusion to the above analysis of these legal con-
flicts is that, although the approval of the five basic plans affords a
solid legal foundation upon which the piggyback concept may build,
any modification or variation in the existing and formally approved
plans will almost certainly be accompanied by litigation. Some voices
of protest have already been referred to, as has the fact that the ICC
must, in the near future, come to grips with the additional services
tendered by various railroads in Docket No. 32533. An awareness of
the basic principles and legal conflicts discussed herein should result
not only in a greater appreciation of the formidable obstacles which
the Commission faces in resolving these conflicts, but also in a deeper
understanding of the ultimate solution itself.
75 305 U.S. 507, 523-24 (1939).
76 164 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1947).
77 Id. at 643. (Emphasis supplied by the court.)
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